Myerson's classic result provides a full description of how a seller can maximize revenue when selling a single item. We address the question of revenue maximization in the simplest possible multi-item setting: two items and a single buyer who has independently distributed values for the items, and an additive valuation. In general, the revenue achievable from selling two independent items may be strictly higher than the sum of the revenues obtainable by selling each of them separately.
general, the revenue achievable from selling two independent items may be strictly higher than the sum of the revenues obtainable by selling each of them separately.
In fact, the structure of optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) mechanisms for two items even in this simple setting is not understood.
In this paper we obtain approximate revenue optimization results using two simple auctions: that of selling the items separately, and that of selling them as a single bundle. Our main results (which are of a "direct sum" variety, and apply to any distributions) are as follows. Selling the items separately guarantees at least half the revenue of the optimal auction; for identically distributed items, this becomes at least 73% of the optimal revenue.
For the case of k > 2 items, we show that selling separately guarantees at least a c/ log 2 k fraction of the optimal revenue; for identically distributed items, the bundling auction yields at least a c/ log k fraction of the optimal revenue.
1 Introduction items separately. For the distribution taking values 0 and 1, each with probability 1/2, selling the bundle can yield at most a revenue of 3/4, and this is less than twice the single-item revenue of 1/2. In some other cases neither selling separately nor bundling is optimal. For the distribution that takes values 0, 1 and 2, each with probability 1/3, the unique optimal auction turns out to offer to the buyer the choice between any single item at price 2, and the bundle of both items at a "discount" price of 3. This auction gets revenue of 13/9 revenue, which is larger than the revenue of 4/3 obtained from either selling the two items separately, or from selling them as a single bundle. A similar situation happens for the uniform distribution on [0, 1], for which neither bundling nor selling separately is optimal (Manelli and Vincent [2006] ). In yet other cases the optimal mechanism is not even deterministic and must offer lotteries for the items. This happens in the following example from Hart and Reny [2012] 4 : Let F be the distribution which takes values 1, 2 and 4, with probabilities 1/6, 1/2, 1/3, respectively. It turns out that the unique optimal mechanism offers the buyer the choice between buying any one good with probability 1/2 for a price of 1, and buying the bundle of both goods (surely) for a price of 4; any deterministic mechanism has a strictly lower revenue. So, it is not clear what optimal mechanisms for selling two items look like, and indeed characterizations of optimal auctions even for this simple case are not known. We shorty describe some of the previous work on these type of issues. McAfee and McMillan [1988] identify cases where the optimal mechanism is deterministic. However, Thanassoulis [2004] and Manelli and Vincent [2006] found a technical error in the paper and exhibit counter-examples. These last two papers contain good surveys of the work within economic theory, with more recent analysis by Fang and Norman [2006] , Jehiel et al. [2007] , Hart and Reny [2010] , Lev [2011] , Hart and Reny [2012] . In the last few years algorithmic work on these types of topics was carried out. One line of work (e.g. Briest et al. [2010] and Cai et al. [2012] ) shows that for discrete distributions the optimal auction can be found by linear programming in rather general settings. This is certainly true in our simple setting where the direct representation of the auction constraints provides a polynomial size linear program. Thus we emphasize that the difficulty in our case is not computational, but is rather that of characterization and understanding the results of the explicit computations: this is certainly so for continuous distributions, but also for discrete ones.
5 Another line of work in computer science (Chawla et al. [2007] , Chawla et al. 4 Previous examples where randomization helps appear in Thanassoulis [2004] , Manelli and Vincent [2006] , Manelli and Vincent [2007] , and Pychia [2006] , but they require interdependent distributions of values, rather than independent and identically distributed values; see also Example 3(ii) in Pavlov [2011] .
5 If we limit ourselves to deterministic auctions (and discrete distributions), finding the optimal one is easy computationally in the case of one buyer (just enumerate), in contrast to the general case of multiple buyers with correlated values for which computational complexity difficulty has been established [2010a] , Chawla et al. [2010b] , Daskalakis and Weinberg [2011] ) attempts approximating the optimal revenue by simple mechanisms. This was done for various settings, especially unit-demand settings and some generalizations. One conclusion from this line of work is that for many subclasses of distributions (such as those with monotone hazard rate) various simple mechanisms can extract a constant fraction of the expected value of the items 6 . This is true in our simple setting, where for such distributions selling the items separately provides a constant fraction of the expected value and thus of the optimal revenue.
The current paper may be viewed as continuing this tradition of approximating the optimal revenue with simple auctions. It may also be viewed as studying the extent to which auctions can gain revenue by doing things that appear less "natural" (such as pricing lotteries whose outcomes are the items; of course, the better our understanding becomes, the more things we may consider as natural.) We study two very simple and natural auctions that we show do give good approximations: the first simple auction is to sell the items separately and independently, and the second simple auction is to sell all items together as a bundle. We emphasize that our results hold for arbitrary distributions and we do not make any assumptions (such as monotone hazard rate).
7 In particular, our approximations to the optimal revenue also hold when the expected value of the items is arbitrarily (even infinitely) larger than the optimal revenue. We will denote by Rev(F ) ≡ Rev k (F ) the optimal revenue obtainable from selling, to a single buyer (with an additive valuation), k items whose valuation is distributed according to a (k-dimensional joint) distribution F . This revenue is well understood only for the special case of one item (k = 1), i.e., for a one-dimensional F , in which case it is obtained by selling at the Myerson price (i.e., Rev 1 (F ) = sup p≥0 p · (1 − F (p)). The first three theorems below relate the revenue obtainable from selling multiple independent items optimally (which is not well understood) to the revenue obtainable by selling each of them separately (which is well understood).
Our first and main result shows that while selling two independent items separately need not be optimal, it is not far from optimal and always yields at least half of the optimal revenue. We do not know of any easier proof that provides any constant approximation bound.
8
by Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2011] . 6 In our setting ths is true even more generally, for instance whenever the ratio between the median and the expectation is bounded, which happens in particular when the tail of the distribution is "thinner" than x −α for α > 1. 7 One may argue that there is no need for uniform approximation results on the ground that the seller knows the distribution of the buyer's valuation. However, as we have shown above, that does not help finding the optimal auction (even for simple distributions) -whereas the approximations are always easy and simple (as they use only optimal prices for one-dimensional distributions).
8 There is an easy proof for the special case of deterministic auctions, which we leave as an exercise
The joint distribution of two items distributed independently according to F 1 and F 2 , respectively, is denoted by F 1 × F 2 .
Theorem 1 For every one-dimensional distributions F 1 and F 2 ,
This result is quite robust and generalizes to auctions with multiple buyers, using either the Dominant-Strategy or the Bayes-Nash notions of implementation. It also generalizes to multi-dimensional distributions, i.e., to cases of selling two collections of items, and even to more general mechanism design settings (see Theorems 20 and 30). 9 However, as we show in a companion paper Hart and Nisan [2012] , such a result does not hold when the values for the items are allowed to be correlated: there exists a joint distribution
of item values such that the revenue obtainable from each item separately is finite, but selling the items optimally yields infinite revenue. For the special case of two identically distributed items (one-dimensional and single buyer), i.e., F 1 = F 2 , we get a tighter result.
Theorem 2 For every one-dimensional distribution F ,
Thus, for two independent items, each distributed according to F , taking the optimal
Myerson price for a single item distributed according to F and offering the buyer to choose which items to buy at that price per item (none, either one, or both), is guaranteed to yield at least 73% of the optimal revenue for the two items. This holds for any distribution F (and recall that, in general, we do not know what that optimal revenue is; in contrast, the Myerson price is well-defined and immediate to determine).
There is a small gap between this bound of e/(e + 1) = 0.73... and the best separation that we have with a gap of of 0.78... (see Corollary 29). We conjecture that the latter is in fact the tight bound.
We next consider the case of more than two items. It turns out that, as the number of items grows, the ratio between the revenue obtainable from selling them optimally to that obtainable by selling them separately is unbounded. In fact, we present an example to the reader. It does not seem that this type of easy proof can be extended to general auctions since it would apply also to interdependent item values in which case, as we show in a companion paper Hart and Nisan [2012] , there is no finite bound relating the two-item revenue to that of selling them separately.
9 However, we have not been able to generalize these decomposition results to multiple buyers and multiple items simultaneously.
showing that the ratio may be as large as O(log k) (see Lemma 8). Our main positive result for the case of multiple items is a bound on this gap in terms of the number of items. When the k items are independent and distributed according to F 1 , . . . , F k , we write F 1 × · · · × F k for their product joint distribution.
Theorem 3 There exists a constant c > 0 such that for every integer k ≥ 2 and every one-dimensional distributions F 1 , . . . , F k ,
We then consider the other simple single-dimensional auction, the bundling auction, which offers a single price for the bundle of all items.
10 We ask how well it can approximate the optimal revenue. We first observe that, in general, the bundling auction may do much worse and only yield a revenue that is a factor of almost k times lower than that of the optimal auction (see Example 15; moreover, we show in Lemma 14 that this is tight up to a constant factor). However, when the items are independent and identically distributed, then the bundling auction does much better. It is well known (Armstrong [1999] , Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1999] ) that for every fixed distribution F , as the number of items distributed independently according to F approaches infinity, the bundling auction approaches the optimal one (for completeness we provide a short proof in Appendix D.) This, however, requires k to grow as F remains fixed. On the other hand, we show that this is not true uniformly over F : for every large enough k, there are distributions where the bundling auction on k items extracts less than 57% of the optimal revenue (Example 19). Our main result for the bundling auction is that in this case it extracts a logarithmic (in the number of items k) fraction of the optimal revenue. We do not know whether the loss is in fact bounded by a constant fraction. Since the distribution of the sum of k independent and identically distributed according to F items is the k-times convolution F * · · · * F , our result is:
Theorem 4 There exists a constant c > 0 such that for every integer k ≥ 2 and every one-dimensional distribution F ,
Many problems are left open. From the general point of view, the characterization of the optimal auction is still mostly open, despite the many partial results in the cited papers. In particular, it is open to fully characterize when selling separately is optimal;
10 By Myerson's result, this is indeed the optimal mechanism for selling the bundle.
when the bundling auction is optimal 11 ; or when are deterministic auctions optimal. More specifically, regarding our approximation results, gaps remain between our lower bounds and upper bounds.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present our notations and the preliminary setup. Section 3 studies the relations between the bundling auction and selling separately; these relations are not only interesting in their own right, but are then also used as part of the general analysis and provide us with most of the examples that we have for gaps in revenue. Section 4 studies the case of two items, gives the main decomposition theorem together with a few extensions; Section 5 gives our results for more than two items. Several proofs are postponed to appendices. Finally, Appendix E provides a table summarizing our bounds on the revenue gaps between the separate auction and the optimal auction, and between the bundling auction and the optimal auction.
Notation and Preliminaries

Mechanisms
A mechanism for selling k items specifies a (possibly randomized) protocol for interaction between a seller (who has no private information and commits to the mechanism) and a buyer who has a private valuation for the items. The outcome of the mechanism is an allocation specifying the probability of getting each of the k items and an (expected) 12 payment that the buyer gives to the seller. We will use the following notations:
• Buyer valuation: x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) where x i ≥ 0 denotes the value of the buyer for getting item i.
• Allocation: q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ) ∈ [0, 1] k , where q i = q i (x) denotes the probability that item i is allocated to the buyer when his valuation is x (alternatively, one may interpret q i as the fractional quantity of item i that the buyer gets).
• Seller revenue: s = s(x) denotes the expected payment 13 that the seller receives from the buyer when the buyer's valuation is x.
11 We do show that this is the case for a class of distributions that decrease not too slowly; see Theorem 28.
12 We only consider risk-neutral agents. 13 In the literature this is also called transfer, cost, price, revenue, and denoted by p, t, c, etc. We hope that using the mnemonic s for the S eller's final payoff and b for the Buyer's final payoff will avoid confusion.
• Buyer utility: b = b(x) denotes the utility of the buyer when his valuation is x, i.e.,
We will be discussing mechanisms that are:
• IR -(Ex-post) Individually Rational: b(x) ≥ 0 for all x.
• IC -Incentive Compatible:
The IC requirement simply captures the notion that the buyer acts strategically in the mechanism. Since we are discussing a single buyer, this is in a simple decision-theoretic sense and in particular there is no distinction between the dominant strategy and the Bayes-Nash implementation notions. The following lemma gives well known and easily proven equivalent conditions for incentive compatibility (see Hart and Reny [2012] for a tighter characterization).
Lemma 5
The following three definitions are equivalent for a mechanism with b(
1. The mechanism is IC.
2. The allocation q is weakly monotone, in the sense that for all x, x ′ we have
, and the payment to the seller satisfies
3. The buyer's utility b is a convex function of x and for all x the allocation q(x) is a subgradient of b at x, i.e., for all x ′ we have b(
In particular b is differentiable almost everywhere and there q i (x) = ∂b(x)/∂x i .
Proof.
• 1 implies 2: The RHS of the second part is the IC constraint for x, the LHS is the IC constraint for x ′ , and the whole second part directly implies the first part.
• 2 implies 1: Conversely, the RHS of the second part is exactly the IC constraint for x.
• 1 implies 3:
is a supremum of linear functions of x and is thus convex. For the second part, b(
where the inequality is exactly the IC constraint for x ′ .
• 3 implies 1: Conversely, as in the previous line, the subgradient property at x is exactly equivalent to the IC constraint for x ′ .
Note that this in particular implies that any convex function b with 0 ≤ ∂b(x)/∂x i ≤ 1 for all i defines an incentive compatible mechanism by setting q i (x) = ∂b(x)/∂x i (at nondifferentiability points take q to be an arbitrary subgradient of b) and s(x) = x·q(x)−b(x).
When x 1 , . . . , x k are distributed according to the joint cumulative distribution function F on 14 R k + , the expected revenue of the mechanism given by b is
Thus we want to maximize this expression over all convex functions b with 0 ≤ ∂b(x)/∂x i ≤ 1 for all i. We can also assume
This is without loss of generality as any IC and IR mechanism can be converted into an NPT one, with the revenue only increasing.
15 This in particular implies that b(0) = s(0) = 0 without loss of generality (as it follows from IR+NPT).
Revenue
For a cumulative distribution F on R k + (for k ≥ 1), we consider the optimal revenue obtainable from selling k items to a (single, additive) buyer whose valuation for the k items is jointly distributed according to F :
is the maximal revenue obtainable by any incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism.
• SRev(F ) is the maximal revenue obtainable by selling each item separately.
• BRev(F ) is the maximal revenue obtainable by bundling all items together.
Thus, Rev(F ) = sup b R(b; F ) where b ranges over all convex functions with 0 ≤ ∂b(x)/∂x i ≤ 1 for all i and b(0) = 0. It will be often convenient to use random variables rather than distributions, and thus we use Rev(X) and Rev(F ) interchangeably when the buyer's valuation is a random variable X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) with values in R k + distributed according to F . In this case we have SRev(X) = Rev(X 1 ) + · · · + Rev(X k ) and
14 We write this as x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∼ F . We use F for multi-dimensional distributions and F for one-dimensional distributions.
15 For each x with s(x) < 0 redefine q(x) and s(x) as q(x ′ ) and s(
Alternatively, since IC implies that s(x) ≥ s(0) for all x, if the IR and IC mechanism (q(·), s(·)) does not satisfy NPT then s(0) < 0 and the mechanism (q(·), s(·) + σ) where σ:= − s(0) > 0 is also IC (shifting s by a constant does not affect the IC constraints) and IR (use IC at x = 0)-and its revenue is higher by σ > 0. This paper will only deal with independently distributed item values, that is, For k = 1 we have Myerson's characterization of the optimal revenue:
Note that for any k, both the separate revenue SRev and the bundling revenue BRev require solving only one-dimensional problems; by Myerson's characterization, the former is given by k item prices p 1 , . . . , p k , and the latter by one pricep for all items together.
Warm up: Selling Separately vs. Bundling
In this section we analyze the gaps between the two simple auctions: bundling and selling the items separately. Not only are these comparisons interesting in their own right, but they will be used as part of our general analysis, and will also provide the largest lower bounds we have on the approximation ratios of these two auctions relative to the optimal revenue.
We start with a particular distribution which will turn out to be key to our analysis. We then prove upper bounds on the bundling revenue in terms of the separate revenue, and finally we prove upper bounds on the separate revenue in terms of the bundling revenue.
The Equal-Revenue Distribution
We introduce the distribution which we will show is extremal in the sense of maximizing the ratio between the bundling auction revenue and the separate auction revenue.
Let us denote by ER -the equal-revenue distribution -the distribution with density
for x ≥ 1 (and for x < 1 we have f (x) = 0 and F (x) = 0). (This is also called the Pareto distribution with parameter α = 1.) It is easy to see that, on one hand, Rev 1 (ER) = 1 and, moreover, this revenue is obtained by choosing any price p ≥ 1. On the other hand 16 As these are cumulative distribution functions, we have
The formula for SRev holds without independence, with F i the i-th marginal distribution of F .
its expected value is infinite:
We start with a computation of the distribution of the weighted sum of two ER distributions.
Lemma 6 Let X 1 , X 2 be 18 i.i.d.-ER and α, β > 0. Then
for z ≥ α + β, and P(αX 1 + βX 2 ≥ z) = 1 for z ≤ α + β.
We can now calculate the revenue obtainable from bundling several independent ER items.
Lemma 7 BRev(ER × ER) = 2.5569... , where 2.5569... = 2(w + 1) with w the solution of 20 we w = 1/e.
Remark. We will see below (Corollary 29) that bundling is optimal here, and so 2.5569... is in fact the optimal revenue for two i.i.d.-ER items.
Proof. Using Lemma 6 with α = β = 1 yields p · P(
−1 log(p − 1) + 2, which attains its maximum of 2w + 2 at p = 1 + 1/w.
Lemma 8 There exist constants c 1 , c 2 > 0 such that for all k ≥ 2,
In particular, this shows that selling separately may yield, as k increases, an arbitrarily small proportion of the optimal revenue:
Proof. Let X be a random variable with distribution ER; for M ≥ 1 let X M := min{X, M} be X truncated at M. It is immediate to compute E(X M ) = log M + 1 and
• Lower bound :
large enough, and then Rev(
• Upper bound : We need to bound sup p≥0 p · P(
The second term is at most
To estimate the first term, we again use Chebyshev's inequality. When k is large enough we have p/(k(log p + 1)) ≤ 2 (recall that p ≥ 6k log k), and so p is at least p/(8k) standard deviations above the mean of
Remark. A more precise analysis, based on the "Generalized Central Limit Theorem,"
converges in distribution to the Cauchy distribution as k → ∞. Since Rev 1 (Cauchy) can be shown to be bounded (by 1/π), it follows that Rev(
21 See, e.g., Zaliapin et al. [2005] .
Upper Bounds on the Bundling Revenue
It turns out that the equal revenue distribution exhibits the largest possible ratio between the bundling auction and selling separately. This is a simple corollary from the fact that the equal revenue distribution has the heaviest possible tail.
Let X and Y be one-dimensional random variables. We say that X is (first-order) stochastically dominated by Y if for every real p we have P(X ≥ p) ≤ P(Y ≥ p). Thus, Y gets higher values than X.
It should be noted that this monotonicity of the revenue with respect to stochastic dominance does not hold when there are two or more items Hart and Reny [2012] .
Lemma 10 For every one-dimensional X and every r > 0: Rev 1 (X) ≤ r if and only if X is stochastically dominated by 22 r · ER.
Proof. By Myerson's characterization, Rev(X) ≤ r if and only if for every p we have P(X ≥ p) ≤ r/p ; but r/p is precisely the probability that r · ER is at least p.
We will thus need to consider sums of "scaled" versions of ER, i.e., linear combinations of independent ER random variables. What we will see next is that equalizing the scaling factors yields stochastic domination.
Lemma 6, for z ≤ γ we have P(Z ≥ z) = P(Z ′ ≥ z) = 1, and for z > γ we get
We slightly abuse the notation and write r · ER for a random variable r · Y when Y is distributed according to ER.
23 Equivalently, |α − β| ≥ |α
since t log(1 + 1/t) is increasing in t for t > 0, and
We note the following useful fact: if for every i, X i is stochastically dominated by
Corollary 12 Let X i be i.i.d.-ER and α i > 0. Then
Proof. If, say, α 1 <ᾱ < α 2 , then the previous lemma implies that α 1 X 1 + α 2 X 2 is stochastically dominated byᾱX 1 + α ′ 2 X 2 ,where α ′ 2 = α 1 + α 2 −ᾱ, and so
Continue in the same way until all coefficients becomeᾱ.
We can now provide our upper bounds on the bundling revenues.
where 1.278... = w + 1 with w the solution of we w = 1/e.
(ii) There exists a constant c > 0 such that for every k ≥ 2 and every one-dimensional distributions F 1 , . . . , F k ,
Proof. Let X i be distributed according to F i , and denote r i = Rev(F i ), so X i is stochastically dominated by r i Y i where Y i is distributed according to ER (see Lemma 10). Assume that the X i are independent, and also that the Y i are independent. Then
, and the results (i) and (ii) follow from Lemmas 7 and 8 respectively.
Lower Bounds on the Bundling Revenue
In general, the bundling revenue obtainable from items that are independently distributed according to different distributions may be significantly smaller than the separate revenue.
24 Think of all the random variables being defined on the same probability space and satisfying X i ≤ Y i pointwise (which can be obtained by the so-called "coupling" construction), and then
Lemma 14 For every integer k ≥ 1 and every one-dimensional distributions F 1 , . . . , F k ,
Proof. For every i we have Rev(
This is tight:
Take a large M and let
and so SRev(
is easily seen to be at most
However, when the items are distributed according to identical distributions, the bundling revenue cannot be much smaller than the separate revenue, and this is the case that the rest of this section deals with.
Lemma 16 For every one-dimensional distribution F ,
Proof. Let X be distributed according to F ; let p be the optimal Myerson price for X and q = P(X ≥ p), so Rev(F ) = pq. If q ≤ 2/3 then the bundling auction can offer a price of p and the probability that the bundle will be sold is at least the probability that one of the items by itself has value p, which happens with probability 2q − q 2 = q(2 − q) ≥ 4q/3, so the revenue will be at least 4q/3 · p = (4/3)Rev(F ). On the other hand, if q ≥ 2/3 then the bundling auction can offer price 2p, and the probability that it will be accepted is at least the probability that both items will get value of at least p, i.e. q 2 . The revenue will be 2q
This bound is tight:
Let F have support {0, 1} with P(1) = 2/3, then Rev(F ) = 2/3 while BRev(F × F ) = 8/9 (which is obtained both at price 1 and at price 2).
25
We write F * k for the k-times convolution of F ; this is the distribution of the sum of k i.i.d. random variables each distributed according to F .
Lemma 18
For every integer k ≥ 1 and every one-dimensional distribution F ,
Proof. Let X be distributed according to F ; let p be the optimal Myerson price for X and q = P(X ≥ p), so Rev(F ) = pq. We separate between two cases. If qk ≤ 1 then the bundling auction can offer price p and, using inclusion-exclusion, the probability that it will be taken is bounded from below by kq − k 2 q 2 ≥ kq/2 so the revenue will be at least kqp/2 ≥ k · Rev(F )/2. If qk ≥ 1 then we can offer price p⌊qk⌋. Since the median in a Binomial(k, q) distribution is known to be at least ⌊qk⌋, the probability that the buyer will buy is at least 1/2. The revenue will be at least p⌊qk⌋/2 ≥ kqp/4 = k · Rev(F )/4.
We have not attempted optimizing this constant 1/4, which can be easily improved.
The largest gap that we know of is the following example where the bundling revenue is less than 57% than that of selling the items separately, and applies to all large enough k.
We suspect that this is in fact the maximal possible gap.
Example 19 For every k large enough, a one-dimensional distribution F such that
Take a large k and consider the distribution F on {0, 1} with P(1) = c/k where c = 1.256... is the solution of 1 − e −c = 2(1 − (c + 1)e −c ), so the revenue from selling a single item is c/k. The bundling auction should clearly offer an integral price. If it offers price 1 then the probability of selling is 1
which is also the expected revenue. If it offers price 2 then the probability of selling is
and the revenue is twice that, again 0.715.... If it offers price 3 then the probability of selling is 1
2)e −c ≈ 0.13..., and the revenue is three times higher, which is less than 0.715. For higher integral prices t the probability of selling is bounded from above by c t /t!, the revenue is t times that, and is even smaller.
Thus BRev(F ×k )/SRev(F ×k ) ≈ 0.715/1.256 ≤ 0.57 for all k large enough.
Two Items
Our main result is an "approximate direct sum" theorem. We start with a short proof of Theorem 1 which deals with two independent items. The arguments used in this proof are then extended to a more general setup of two independent sets of items.
A Direct Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we provide a short and direct proof of Theorem 1 (see the Introduction), which says that Rev(
Proof of Theorem 1. Let X and Y be independent one-dimensional nonnegative random variables. Take any IC and IR mechanism (q, s). We will split its expected revenue into two parts, according to which one of X and Y is maximal:
recall that s ≥ 0 by NPT). We will show that
interchanging X and Y completes the proof.
To prove (2), for every fixed value y of Y define a mechanism (q,s) for X byq(x) := q 1 (x, y) ands(x) := s(x, y) − yq 2 (x, y) for every x (so the buyer's payoff remains the same:b(x) = b(x, y)). The mechanism (q,s) is IC and IR for X, since (q, s) was IC and IR for (X, Y ) (only the IC constraints with y fixed, i.e., (x ′ , y) vs. (x, y), matter). Let s(x) =s(x) + σ, where σ:= max{−s(0), 0} ≥ 0, then the mechanism (q,ŝ) also satisfies NPT (see the second paragraph of footnote 15). Therefore
where we have usedŝ ≥ 0 for the second inequality; σ ≥ 0 for the third inequality;
s(x) = s(x, y) − yq 2 (x, y) ≥ s(x, y) − y (since y ≥ 0 and q 2 ≤ 1) for the fourth inequality; and E(½ X≥y y) = P(X ≥ y) y ≤ Rev(X) (since posting a price of y is an IC and IR mechanism for X) for the last inequality. This holds for every value y of Y ; taking expectation over y (recall that X is independent of Y ) yields (2).
The Main Decomposition Result
We now generalize the decomposition of the previous section to two sets of items. In this section X is a k 1 -dimensional nonnegative random variable and Y is a k 2 -dimensional nonnegative random variable (with k 1 , k 2 ≥ 1). While we will assume that the vectors X and Y are independent, we allow for arbitrary interdependence among the coordinates of X, and the same for the coordinates of Y .
Theorem 20 (Generalization of Theorem 1) Let X and Y be multi-dimensional nonnegative random variables. If X and Y are independent then
The proof of this theorem is divided into a series of lemmas. The main insights are the "Marginal Mechanism" (Lemma 21) and the "Smaller Value" (Lemma 25).
The first attempt in bounding the revenue from two items, is to fix one of them and look at the induced marginal mechanism on the second. Let us use the notation Val(X) = E( i X i ) = i E(X i ), the expected total sum of values, for multi-dimensional X's (for one-dimensional X this is Val(X) = E(X).)
Lemma 21 (Marginal Mechanism) Let X and Y be multi-dimensional nonnegative random variables (here X and Y may be dependent). Then
where (X|Y ) denotes the conditional distribution of X given Y .
Proof. Take a mechanism (q, s) for (X, Y ), and fix some value of y = (y 1 , . . . , y k 2 ). The induced mechanism on the X-items, which are distributed according to (X|Y = y), is IC and IR, but also hands out quantities of the Y items. If we modify it so that instead of allocating y j with probability q j = q j (x, y), it pays back to the buyer an additional money amount of q j y j , we are left with an IC and IR mechanism for the X items. The revenue of this mechanism is that of the original mechanism conditioned on Y = y minus the expected value of j q j y j , which is bounded from above by j y j . Now take expectation over the values y of Y to get
Remark. When X and Y are independent then (X|Y = y) = X for every y and thus
Unfortunately this does not suffice to get good bounds since it is entirely possible for
Val(Y ) to be infinite even when Rev(Y ) is finite (as happens, e.g., for the equal-revenue distribution ER.) We will have to carefully cut up the domain of (X, Y ), bound the value of one of the items in each of these sub-domains, and then stitch the results together; see Lemma 24 below. We will use Z to denote an arbitrary multi-dimensional nonnegative random variable, but the reader may want to think of it as (X, Y ).
Lemma 22 (Sub-Domain Restriction) Let Z be a multi-dimensional nonnegative random variable and let S be a set of values of 26 Z. Then for any IC and IR mechanism (q, s)
Proof. For the second inequality: the optimal mechanism for ½ Z∈S Z will extract at least as much from Z. This follows directly from an optimal mechanism having No Positive Transfers (see the end of Section 2.1). For the first inequality: useŝ(z) = s(z) + σ which satisfies NPT, where σ:= max{−s(0), 0} ≥ 0 (see the second paragraph of footnote 15).
Lemma 23 (Sub-Domain Stitching) Let Z be a multi-dimensional nonnegative random variable and let S, T be two sets of values of Z such that S ∪ T contains the support of Z. Then
Proof. Take the optimal mechanism for Z, which, without loss of generality, satisfies NPT. Rev(Z) is the revenue extracted by this mechanism, which is at most the sum of what is extracted on S and on T . If you take the same mechanism and run it on the random variable ½ Z∈S Z, it will extract the same amount on S as it extracted from Z on S, and similarly for T which contains the complement of S.
Our trick will be to choose S so that we are able to bound Val(½ (X,Y )∈S Y ). This will suffice since we have:
Lemma 24 (Marginal Mechanism on Sub-Domain) Let X and Y be multi-dimensional nonnegative random variables, and let S be a set of values of (X, Y ). If X and Y are independent then
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 21. For every y put S y = {x|(x, y) ∈ S}. Take an IC and IR mechanism (q, s) for (x, y), and fix some value of y = (y 1 , . . . , y k 2 ). The induced mechanism on the x-items is IC and IR, but also hands out quantities of the y items. If we modify it so that instead of allocating y j with probability q j = q j (x, y), it reduces the buyer's payment by the amount of q j y j , we are left with an IC and IR 26 If Z is a k-dimensional random variable, then S is a (measurable) subset of R k + . We use the notation ½ Z∈S for the indicator random variable which takes the value 1 when Z ∈ S and 0 otherwise. mechanism, call it (q,s), for the x items. Now s(x, y) =s(x) + j q j y j ≤s(x) + j y j , and so, conditioning on Y = y,
(the first equality since X and Y are independent). Thes term is bounded from above by Rev(½ X∈Sy X), which is at most Rev(X) by the Sub-Domain Restriction Lemma 22;
taking expectation over the values y of Y completes the proof.
In the case of two items, i.e. one-dimensional X and Y , the set of values S for which we bound Val(½ (X,Y )∈S Y ) will be the set {Y ≤ X}.
Lemma 25 (Smaller Value) Let X and Y be one-dimensional nonnegative random variables. If X and Y are independent then
Proof. A possible mechanism for X that yields revenue of Val(½ Y ≤X Y ) is the following: choose a random y according to Y and offer this as the price. The expected revenue of
so this is a lower bound on Rev(X).
The proof of Theorem 1 can now be restated as follows:
Proof of Theorem 20 -one-dimensional case.
Using the Sub-Domain Stitching Lemma 23, we will cut the space as follows: 
Proof. Apply Lemma 25 to the one-dimensional random variables i X i and j Y j , and recall that Rev( i X i ) = BRev(X).
From this we get a slightly stronger version of Theorem 20 for multi-dimensional variables (which will be used in Section 5 to get bounds for any fixed number of items).
Theorem 27 Let X and Y be multi-dimensional nonnegative random variables. If X and Y are independent then
Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of the main theorem. We will cut the space by
, and bound the first term by Val(½ j Y j +Rev(X)≤ i X i Y ) ≤ BRev(X) + Rev(X) using Lemmas 24 and 26. The second term is bounded similarly.
Proof of Theorem 20 -multi-dimensional case. Use the previous theorem and
Remark. The decomposition of this section holds in more general setups than the totally additive valuation of this paper (where the value to the buyer of the outcome q ∈ [0, 1] k is i q i x i ). Indeed, consider an abstract mechanism design problem with a set of alternatives A, valuated by the buyer according to a function v : A → R + (known to him, whereas the seller only knows that the function v is drawn from a certain distribution). If the set of alternatives A is in fact a product A = A 1 × A 2 with the valuation additive between the two sets, i.e., v(a 1 , a 2 ) = v 1 (a 1 ) + v 2 (a 2 ), with v 1 distributed according to X and v 2 acording to Y , then Theorem 20 holds as stated. The proof now uses
Val(Y ) = E(sup a 2 ∈A 2 v 2 (a 2 )) (which, in our case, where
A Tighter Result for Two I.I.D. Items
For the special case of two independent and identically distributed items we have a tighter result, namely Theorem 2 stated in the Introduction. The proof is more technical and is relegated to Appendix A.
A Class of Distributions Where Bundling Is Optimal
For some special cases we are able to fully characterize the optimal auction for two items. We will show that bundling is optimal for distributions whose density function decreases fast enough; this includes the equal-revenue distribution.
Theorem 28 Let F be a one-dimensional cumulative distribution function with density function f . Assume that there is a > 0 such that for x < a we have f (x) = 0 and for x > a the function f (x) is differentiable and satisfies
Then bundling is optimal for two items:
Theorem 28 is proved in Appendix B. Condition (3) is equivalent to
or the half-line [a, ∞)). When f (x) = cx −γ , (3) holds whenever γ ≥ 3/2. In particular, ER satisfies (3); thus, by Lemma 7, we have:
Thus SRev(ER × ER)/Rev(ER × ER) = 2/2.559... = 0.78..., which the largest gap we have obtained between the separate auction and the optimal one.
Multiple Buyers
Up to now we dealt a single buyer, but it turns out that the main decomposition result generalizes to the case of multiple buyers. We consider selling the two items (with a single unit of each) to n buyers, where buyer j's valuation for the first item is X j , and for the second item is Y j (with X j + Y j being the value for getting both). Let the auction allocate the first item to buyer j with probability q j 1 , and the second item with probability q j 2 ; of course, here n j=1 q j 1 ≤ 1 and n j=1 q j 2 ≤ 1. Unlike the simple decision-theoretic problem facing the single buyer, we now have a multi-person game among the buyers. Thus, we consider two main notions of incentive compatibility: dominant-strategy IC and Bayes-Nash IC. Our result below applies equally well to both notions, and with an identical proof.
For either one of these notions, we denote by Rev [n] (X, Y ) the revenue that is obtainable by the optimal auction. Similarly, selling the two items separately yields a maximal
The buyers' valuations for each good are assumed to be independent, i.e., X j and X j ′ are independent for every j, j ′ , and the same holds for Y j and Y j ′ (see however the remark below). Together with the independence between the two goods-i.e., the random vectors X and Y are independent-this says that all the 2n single-good valuations
Theorem 30 Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ R n + be the values of the first item to the n buyers, and let Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) ∈ R n + be the values of the second item to the n buyers. If the buyers and the goods are independent, then
where Rev [n] is taken throughout either with respect to dominant-strategy implementation, or with respect to Bayes-Nash implementation.
Thus selling the two items separately yields at least half the maximal revenue, i.e.,
The proof of Theorem 30 is almost identical to the proof of the Theorem 20 and is spelled out in Appendix C (we also point out there why we could not extend it to multiple buyers and more than 2 items). We emphasize that the proof does not use the characterization of the optimal revenue for a single item and n buyers (just like the proof of Theorem 20 did not use Myerson's characterization for one buyer).
Remark. The assumption in Theorem 30 that the buyers are independent is not needed for dominant strategy implementation (see Appendix C). Moreover, for Bayes-Nash implementation, when the buyers' valuations are correlated, under certain general conditions (see Cremer and McLean 1988) , the seller can extract all the surplus from each good, hence from both goods, and so
More Than Two Items
The multi-dimensional decomposition results of Section 4.2 can be used recursively, by viewing k items as two sets of k/2 items each. Using Theorem 20 we can prove by
, where the first inequality is by Theorem 20, and the second by the induction hypothesis.
However, using the stronger statement of Theorem 27, as well as the relations we have shown between the bundling revenue and the separate revenue, will give us the better bound of c log 2 k (instead of k) of Theorem 3, stated in the Introduction.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume first that k ≥ 2 is a power of 2, and we will prove by
, where c is the constant of Lemma 13. By applying Theorem 27 to (
Using Lemma 13 on each of the BRev terms, their sum is bounded by c log k
Rev(F i ). Using the induction hypothesis on each of the Rev terms, their sum is bounded by
Rev(F i ). Now log k + log 2 k ≤ log 2 (2k), and so the coefficient of each
Rev(F i ) is at most c log 2 (2k) as required.
When 2 m−1 < k < 2 m we can pad to 2 m with items that have value identically zero, and so do not contribute anything to the revenue. This at most doubles k.
As we have seen in Example 15, the bundling auction may, in contrast, extract only 1/k fraction of the optimal revenue. This we can show is tight.
Lemma 31 There exists a constant c > 0 such that for every k ≥ 2 and every one-
Proof. For k a power of two, we use as in the previous proof the decomposition of (4) to obtain by induction Rev(
, where the induction step uses the fact that the bundled revenue from a subset of the items is at most the bundled revenue from all of them. Again, when k is not a power of 2 we can pad to the next power of 2 with items that have value identically zero, which at most doubles k.
However, for identically distributed items the bundling auction does much better, and in fact we can prove a tighter result, with log k instead of k : Theorem 4, stated in the Introduction.
Proof of Theorem 4. For k ≥ 2 a power of two we apply Theorem 27 inductively to obtain:
Each of the log 2 k + 1 terms in this sum is of the form (k/m) BRev(F ×m ) = (k/m) Rev(F * m ) and is thus bounded from above, using Lemma 18 applied to the distribution F * m , by 4 Rev(F * k ) = 4 BRev(F ×k ). Altogether we have 
ϕ(t) dt (recall that b(0, 0) = 0 by IR and NPT).
We will consider the two regions X ≥ Y and Y ≥ X separately; by symmetry, the expected revenue in the two regions is the same, and so it suffices to show that
As in Lemma 21 and Appendix 4.1, fix y and define a mechanism (q y ,s y ) for X bỹ q y (x) := q 1 (x, y) ands y (x) := s(x, y) − yq 2 (x, y) for every x (note that the buyer's payoff remains the same:b y (x) = b(x, y)). The mechanism (q y ,s y ) is IC and IR for X, since (q, s) was IC and IR for (X, Y ). Now apply the mechanism (q y ,s y ) to the random variable X conditional on [X ≥ y], which we write X y for short. Since X y ≥ y we havẽ b y (X y ) = b(X y , y) ≥ b(y, y) = 2Φ(y) andq y (X y ) = q 1 (X y , y) ≥ q 1 (y, y) = ϕ(y), and so applying Lemma 32 below to X y yields
Since P(X y ≥ t) = P(X ≥ t)/P(X ≥ y) =F (t)/F (y) for all t ≥ y, we get
.
Multiply (5) by P(X ≥ y) =F (y) to get
and then take expectation over Y = y :
Since s(x, y) =s y (x) + yq 2 (x, y) ≤s y (x) + yq 2 (x, x) =s y (x) + yϕ(x) (use y ≥ 0 and the monotonicity of q 2 (x, y) in y), we finally get
where
The expression (6) When ϕ(x) = ½ [t,∞) (x) we get Φ(x) = max{x − t, 0} and
(we have used the fact that X, Y are i.i.d., and min{Y, t} = t½ Y ≥t + Y ½ t>Y ). Together
Let r(t) denote the expression in (7). When t ≤ R we have E(min{Y, t}) ≤ R, and so r(t) ≤ R. When t > R we have
where we have usedF (u) ≤ min{R/u, 1} (which follows from R = sup u≥0 uF (u)). Therefore in this case
where τ := t/R > 1. Since max τ ≥1 τ −1 log τ = 1/e (attained at τ = e), it follows that r(t) ≤ (1 + 1/e)R for all t > R, and thus also for all t ≥ 0. Recalling (6) and (7) therefore yields E(s(X, Y )½ X≥Y ) ≤ (1 + 1/e)R, and so E(s(X, Y )) ≤ 2(1 + 1/e)R =
(1 + 1/e) · SRev(F × F ).
Lemma 32 Let X be a one-dimensional random variable whose support is included in [x 0 , ∞) for some x 0 ≥ 0, and let b 0 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ q 0 ≤ 1 be given. Then the maximal revenue the seller can obtain from X subject to guaranteeing to the buyer a payoff of at least b 0 and a probability of getting the item of at least q 0 (i.e., b(x) ≥ b 0 and q(x) ≥ q 0
Proof. A mechanism satisfying these constraints is plainly seen to correspond to a one-
is a convex function with 0 ≤b(x) ≤ 1 andb(x 0 ) = 0, and so
B When Bundling Is Optimal
In this appendix we prove Theorem 28 which is stated in Section 4.3: for two i.i.d. items, if the one-item value distribution satisfies condition (3), then bundling is optimal.
Proof of Theorem 28. Let b correspond to a two-dimensional IC and IR mechanism; assume without loss of generality that b is symmetric, i.e., b(x, y) = b(y, x) (cf. the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A above). Thus E(s) = E(xb x + yb y − b) = E(2xb x − b), and
For each y we integrate by parts the 2xb x (x, y)f (x) term:
Substituting this in (8) yields
Defineb(x, y) := b(x + y − a, a) = b(a, x + y − a) for every (x, y) with x, y ≥ a, theñ b is a convex function on [a, ∞) × [a, ∞) with 0 ≤b x ,b y ≤ 1, and so it corresponds to a two-dimensional IC & IR mechanism. Moreover, since b is convex we have for every
where λ = (x − a)/(x + y − 2a). Therefore replacing b withb can only increase r M , i.e., r M (b) ≤ r M (b); indeed, in the first and third terms the coefficients of b(x, y) are nonnegative (recall our assumption (3)); and in the second term, b(a, y) =b(a, y).
It only remains to observe thatb(x, y) is a function of x + y, and so it corresponds to a bundled mechanism. Formally, put β(t) :=b(t − a, a), then β : [2a, ∞) → R + is a one-dimensional convex function with 0 ≤ β ′ (t) ≤ 1. For all x, y ≥ a with x + y = t we haveb(x, y) = β(t) and xb x (x, y) + yb y (x, y) −b(x, y) = tβ ′ (t) −β(t), and so
C Multiple Buyers
We prove here Theorem 30 (see Section 4.5): selling separately two independent items to n buyers yields at least one half of the optimal revenue. We proceed along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 20 in Section 4.2. The addition of a constant to the payment function s, when needed in order to satisfy NPT (see the second paragraph in footnote 15), is carried out in the dominant-strategy case for each valuation of the other buyers separately, and in the Bayes-Nash case for the expected payment over the other buyers' valuations.
27
X and Y are independent n-dimensional nonnegative random variables, Z is a 2n-dimensional random variable (for instance, (X, Y )), and S and T are sets of values of Z.
Lemma 33 Rev
[n] (X, Y ) ≤ Val [n] (Y ) + Rev [n] (X).
Proof. The proof is similar to the case of a single buyer (Lemma 21), except that the amount of money we need to return to compensate for the y's is exactly Val [n] (Y ) since if each buyer j gets q j 2 units (or probability) of the y item then we have j q j 2 ≤ 1 and thus j q j 2 y j ≤ y max . We emphasize that if the original mechanism for (X, Y ) was a dominant-strategy mechanism, so will be the conditional-on-y mechanism for X; and the same for Bayes-Nash mechanisms.
Lemma 34 Rev
The proof is identical to the case n = 1 (Lemma 22) (see the comment on NPT at the beginning of this appendix).
Lemma 35 If S ∪T contains the support of Z then Rev
[n] (½ Z∈S ·Z)+Rev [n] (½ Z∈T ·Z) ≥
Rev
[n] (Z).
The proof is identical to the case n = 1 (Lemma 23).
Lemma 36 Rev
The proof is identical to the case n = 1 (Lemma 24).
The set according to which we will cut our space will be the following one:
Proof. Here is a possible mechanism for X: choose a random y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) according to Y and offer y max as the take-it-or-leave-it price to the buyers sequentially (the first one in lexicographic order to accept gets it). The expected revenue of this mechanism is exactly Val [n] (½ Y max ≤X max · Y ) so this is a lower bound on Rev [n] (X).
We can now complete our proof.
27 This is the only place where independence between the buyers is used. Remark. The problem when trying to extend this method to more than 2 items is that when Y is a set of items we do not have a "Smaller Value" counterpart to Lemma 37 (recall also Lemma 25).
D Many I.I.D. Items
It turns out that when the items are independent and identically distributed, and their number k tends to infinity, then the bundling revenue approaches the optimal revenue.
Even more, essentially all the buyer's surplus can be extracted by the bundling auction. The logic is quite simple: the law of large numbers tells us that there is almost no uncertainty about the sum of many i.i.d. random variables, and so the seller essentially knows this sum and may ask for it as the bundle price. For completeness we state this result and provide a short proof, which also covers the case where the expectation E(F ) is infinite.
Theorem 38 (Armstrong [1999] , Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1999] ) For every onedimensional distribution F ,
Proof. We always have BRev(F ×k ) ≤ Rev(F ×k ) ≤ k E(F ) (the second inequality follows from NPT). Let us first assume that our distribution F has finite expectation and finite variance. In this case if we charge price (1 − ǫ)k E(F ) for the bundle then by Chebyshev's inequality the probability that the bundle will not be bought is at most
, where Î Ö(F ) is the variance of F , and this goes to zero as k increases.
If the expectation or variance are infinite, then just consider the truncated distribution where values above a certain M are replaced by M, which certainly has finite expectation and variance. We can choose the finite M so as to get the expectation of the truncated distribution as close as we desire to the original one (including as high as we desire, if the original distribution has infinite expectation).
Despite the apparent strength of this theorem, it does not provide any approximation guarantees for any fixed value of k. In particular, for k = 2 we have already seen an example where the bundling auction gets only 2/3 of the revenue of selling the items separately (Example 17), and for every large enough k we have seen an example where the bundling auction's revenue is less than 57% than that of selling the items separately (Example 19); of course, as a fraction of the optimal revenue this can only be smaller. The results of Section 4 provide approximation bounds for each fixed k.
E Summary of Approximation Results
The table below summarizes the approximation results of this paper. The four main results are in bold, and the arrows [ → ] and [ ← ] indicate that the result in that box is a special case of the one in the next box to the right or left, respectively. 
